Since sweeping back into power in December 2012\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s lower house victory, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has pursued a series of reforms aimed at keeping his increasingly marginalized country a tier-one power. Among these efforts, Abe\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s plan for reviving the long-stagnant Japanese economy, dubbed \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Abenomics\u00e2\u20ac\u009d, has received the most attention.<\/p>\n
In the past several months, however, attention has begun to shift toward his government\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s ambitious plans for defense reform. These include a National Security Council (NSC) designed to help Japan better coordinate its defense and diplomacy, revised National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) outlining military strategy and force structure planning over the next ten years, and the first ever National Security Strategy (NSS) explaining Japan\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s comprehensive foreign policy. The new, more assertive national security policy supported by these reforms has been described by Abe as \u00e2\u20ac\u0153active pacifism.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d[1]<\/a><\/p>\n Abe\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s historic opportunity to reset Japan\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s national security policy results from a confluence of international and domestic drivers. The most material of the international drivers is undoubtedly the growing threat of China. The past several years have seen a rise in tensions between the two Asian powers, coming to a head in the Senkaku\/Diaoyu Islands dispute. The recently released NSS and NDPG confirm China\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s central role in Tokyo\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s plans to bolster its defense, emphasizing Chinese military activity near the disputed islands and China\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s recent imposition of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).<\/p>\n An important but more ambiguous international driver is the state of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The NSS argues that Japan needs to make a more \u00e2\u20ac\u0153proactive contribution to peace\u00e2\u20ac\u009d, committing more to its military alliance with the United States.[2]<\/a> While this move reflects American pressure, it may also reflect Japan\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s growing insecurity as to whether the United States will\u00e2\u20ac\u201dor can\u00e2\u20ac\u201dhonor its security assurances, with the United States\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 lack of demand for China to rescind its ADIZ playing on these fears.<\/p>\n While China and the United States serve as international drivers for Japanese defense reform, Japan\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s domestic politics provides the logistics for these changing policies. A shift toward a more conservative public attitude, along with frustration over the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s leadership, resulted in a decisive victory for Abe\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).[3]<\/a> With both the lower house and upper house under their coalition\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s control, the LDP is now comparatively free to apply their conservative mandate in pursuit of defense reform.<\/p>\n Abe himself, who determinately came into his position with the personal goal of Japan becoming a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153normal country\u00e2\u20ac\u009d, heightens the shift toward a more assertive national security policy. His surprise decision to visit Yasakuni Shrine suggests that, despite a recent trend of realism, Abe\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s personal ideology will continue to have a bearing on Japan\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s political trajectory.<\/p>\n All of these drivers have paved the way for a number of developments. Japan will pursue a 5% increase in defense spending for the next five years, leveraging the Japanese lead in technology and focusing on Chinese vulnerabilities. In practice, this means the development of a marine corps, integration of unmanned drones, strengthened real-time military intelligence capacity, and an operational commitment to respond effectively and immediately to Chinese intrusions into disputed air and maritime space.<\/p>\n Concerns about the extremity of potential defense developments persist, particularly in light of Abe\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s widely panned visit to Yasakuni Shrine. In this more assertive vein, the Abe administration has promised to review Japan\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s ban on arms exports. However, the more controversial pursuit of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153first strike\u00e2\u20ac\u009d military capability has been left out of the current plans. Additionally, while Abe predicted in his New Year’s comments that the country\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s war-renouncing constitution \u00e2\u20ac\u0153will have been revised” by 2020, the current plans make no mention of this.[4]<\/a> Abe is expected to aim to lift Japan\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s ban on exercising the right to collective self-defense, but has delayed this decision until after the passage of next year\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s budget in April due to opposition by LDP coalition partner New Komeito. Furthermore, while there had been some concern that Abe was going to pursue aggressive defense reform at the expense of the economy, his recent statement that \u00e2\u20ac\u0153The Abe administration\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s top priority will continue to be economic revitalization in the coming year\u00e2\u20ac\u009d provides hope for moderation.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n The result of Abe\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s defense reform, then, is a generally pragmatic national security agenda that builds on the direction set by Abe\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda.[6]<\/a> Per U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, Japan is set to play \u00e2\u20ac\u0153a more modern, engaged role.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d[7]<\/a> The task for Japan\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s partners\u00e2\u20ac\u201dmost principally the United States\u00e2\u20ac\u201dis to help Japan keep this agenda pragmatic and progressing by addressing the primary drivers of Japan\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s defense reform.<\/p>\n While China\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s rise and insecurity about the United States have been useful proponents of Japanese defense reform, Japan must be reassured on both fronts to guard against potentially destructive insecure behavior. To keep defense reform on track, realist<\/i> Abe must be kept on track and in a strong position. Paradoxically, this depends most of all on encouraging a maintained focus on the economy, a move that will provide the political popularity necessary for Abe\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s defense reforms to run their course while simultaneously turning Abe\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s gaze from more extreme national security options. Ultimately, in assisting with Japan\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s development of an effective and realistic national security policy, Japan\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s partners can give credence to Abe\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s claim that \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Japan is back,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d while maintaining regional security.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Hofilena, John. “PM Abe Publicly Declares Need to Revise Japan’s Pacifist Constitution.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d The Japan Daily Press, 2 Jan. 2014.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [2]<\/a> Japan\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s National-security Strategy: Island Defense.” The Economist, 21 Dec. 2013.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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